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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the political, social and economic realities of China’s rise in an
effort to better understand the potential evolution of Sino-American relations.
Engagement reasons a prosperous China will become democratic and socially pluralistic,
but by observing the development of freedom and rule of law in China and comparing
their relationship with economic growth, trade and investment, this analysis challenges
the idea that China will have to democratize to meet the pressures of globalization.
Economic growth has legitimatized the authoritarian regime in China, freedom is not
related to decisions of trade and investment, and the Chinese people have not grown
closer to America as their ties to the outside world have strengthened. China has changed,
not in the direction American foreign policy desires or international relations theories
predict. My findings confirm China’s rise is uncertain and belief in the inevitability of
democracy or war neglects historical and empirical data.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Questions concerning the nature of China’s rise, its potential evolution, and
whether it necessitates America’s fall, will largely shape the history of the 21st century
and help form the structure of a new international order. 9/11 may have temporarily
altered the framework of U.S. foreign policy and forced it to pay more attention to nonstate threats emanating from the Middle East, but the shear numerical significance of
China’s rise will eventually force America to assume a more definitive stance towards the
Chinese. Terrorism is arguably the most pressing challenge for America today, but the
fundamental truth is the United States cannot even begin to effectively combat global
problems without help from the world’s fastest rising superpower. America needs China,
it cannot ignore or control China, and it must learn to peacefully coexist with a strong
Chinese state if this century hopes to avoid another great power war.
The purpose of this study is to critically evaluate American foreign policy toward
China with emphasis focused on the logic surrounding the strategy of engagement.
Engagement is optimism that foreign trade, investment, integration and economic growth
will directly translate into the inevitable democratization of the Chinese political system.
The research question attempts to understand whether the rise of China, particularly the
historically unparalleled 30 year period of economic growth, where in less than half a
century China evolved from a mindset of strictly self-reliant economic thinking that
shunned foreign investment and capitalist excesses to one where Deng Xiaoping declared
it is glorious to be rich, has also ushered in a more free and open Chinese society and
political system.
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The first section begins with a brief historical analysis of U.S.-Chinese relations
since 1972. The focus is on how American foreign policy toward China has evolved from
a realist posture of ignoring Chinese governmental repression during the Cold War
because of the necessity of counterbalancing Soviet power, to one where continued
economic relations with the PRC is justified under the pretense that China will inevitably
democratize. This section will also detail the reasons China opened to the outside world
in 1978 and it will illustrate how both American and Chinese leaders have typically
depicted the influences that are associated with foreign trade and investment.
The following section will discuss international relations theory and provide an
explanation for how realists, liberals and constructivists view the future of U.S.-Chinese
relations. I will then provide the reader an opportunity to review the various predictions
that have been made in regard to the trajectory of China’s rise. In the next section I will
also explain how international relations theory affects predictions in the China field and
how it has confined the terms of the debate to democratization or collapse.
I will then present my argument, which does not accept the idea that China is
marching toward democracy, that a rich China means a democratic China, or that the
political and social evolution of China’s rise will necessarily be determined by foreign
economic interests. It does accept the premise that the ties of economic interdependency
between the United States and China will continue to strengthen in the future, and that
these ties will help eliminate the chances of a Sino-American war. However, the most
important distinction is that I argue China will not experience the political and social
changes that are generally analogous with economic modernization. The central premise
is that engagement operates from the misunderstanding that the nature of China’s rise
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will be determined by foreign economic influences. I argue the inherit danger in this
attitude is that because it neglects the fact that the international economic order has
become dependent on an efficient Chinese economy, engagement runs the risk of limiting
policy choices designed to foster respect for democracy, rule of law and human rights in
China, and further confuses the relationship between economics and politics.
Drawing from literature that emphasizes China’s mode of integration into the
international system, evidence showing how economic growth has legitimatized the
current Chinese regime, discussions of Chinese nationalism, its various manifestations,
and arguments that stress the shear immensity of the Chinese population, my analysis will
illustrate why China will not democratize. This section will attempt to capture the success
American foreign policy has had in affecting the desired social and political changes in
China that are usually associated with economic modernization. Here I will use a simple
comparison between increased foreign trade and investment, and China’s relative levels
of freedom, democracy and rule of law to illuminate the relationship between politics and
economics in the Chinese state.
The final section will return to American foreign policy toward China and discuss
areas of both convergence and divergence in U.S.-Chinese relations. I will examine the
policy implications of my findings and offer a different approach to interpreting the rise
of China. Because the Chinese economy largely fuels American consumerism, the United
States cannot afford to use the threat of withholding trade and investment in the event
China doesn’t democratize. However, the rise of China does not have to necessitate
America’s fall, but it does mean that a certain restructuring of the international system is
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in order. The age of unipolarity is arguably closing and a return to great power politics is
imminent if the United States cannot come to grips with the reality of China’s rise.
The findings in this analysis demonstrate that a prosperous and increasingly
integrated China has not accepted Western political and social models as ideal or
inevitable in the age of globalization. China’s leaders are aware of the challenge to their
monopoly of power and have devised a survival strategy that utilizes economic growth to
gain legitimacy in the minds of the Chinese people. These findings are not entirely
unique, but they do present a basic challenge to international relations theories and
predictions in the China field. Because there is little evidence suggesting that China will
follow the path other former communist regimes have in the post cold war era and accept
the supremacy of democracy as a political system, and also because the chances of a
Sino-American war have been significantly decreased through economic
interdependency, then American foreign policy must learn to incorporate new thought
patterns in relations with the PRC. China cannot be demonized for not democratizing, but
it also cannot be expected to change without significant external pressures. The
fundamental problem in Sino-American relations is affecting change is not without
significant risk. American foreign policy wants to change China but cannot do such
without disrupting economic relations and the international order. For now, these two
great powers are indeed like scorpions trapped in a bottle, each has the ability to seriously
harm one another but cannot do so without risking a fatal injury in return (Talbott 2003).
The future of Sino-American relations will determine the history of the 21st century, but
currently the trajectory of China’s rise is uncertain and the debate between proponents of
arguments that China will democratize or collapse must be expanded.
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CHAPTER 2
SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
When Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger met with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai
in 1972 to discuss the future of Sino-American relations, a foreign policy of realism was
clearly evident (Mann 2007; Schaller 1979; Talbott 2003). Communist China was
synonymous with the Soviet Union and most Americans viewed the PRC as an integral
member of the Soviet sphere of influence in the Cold War. But rather than allow the
nature of their regime prevent discussions, the United States opted for rapprochement
with the Chinese government on the grounds that China was needed to help balance
Soviet power in the Eastern hemisphere. It may be true that only Richard Nixon, a
staunch anti-communist, could have adopted this approach without risking domestic
political backlash and being labeled soft on communism (Schaller 1979), but the main
impetus behind détente cannot be attributed to any American politician.
The Sino-Soviet schism was the major motivating factor in initiating the
normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations. Although Americans typically viewed China as
part of a homogeneous communist culture headed by the Soviets, the Chinese and the
Soviet Union never exactly acted as a single-unit. The Sino-Soviet relationship had
historical tensions from disagreements over the lack of Soviet aid and from the Soviet
Union forcing China to pay for almost $1 billion in military equipment it desperately
needed during the Korean War. The major issue was theoretical as Mao wanted the
Soviet Union to recognize and promote the Chinese model of development as an ideal
system for third world nations to adopt (Schaller 1979).
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The Soviet Union, however, disagreed with the Chinese policies of communizing
agriculture and “using revolutionary zeal to inspire industrialization” (Schaller 1979,
161). Instead, the Soviets were moving toward peaceful coexistence with the capitalist
powers and the Chinese felt betrayed that the Soviet Union was no longer committed to
aiding China and other revolutionary movements in the world. By the late 1960’s the
Soviet Union became China’s main security concern as Mao labeled the Soviets the “#1
enemy” of peace and over 1 million soldiers faced the Chinese border (Schaller 1979).
Then, on March 2, 1969, the Soviet Union and China became embroiled in a conflict over
Damansky Island in the Ussuri River. This conflict resulted in one of the most surprising
events in Cold War history, as the Brezhnev regime actually questioned the Nixon
administration if the United States would tolerate a Soviet preemptive strike of Chinese
nuclear facilities (Talbott 2003).
Whether or not these Soviet inquiries were serious, President Nixon capitalized on
the occasion by opting to convey his request to normalize relations with the Chinese.
China was unquestionably open to the idea of greater rapport with American leaders. The
invitation of the U.S. table-tennis team to China in 1971, beginning what was labeled the
‘era of ping-pong diplomacy’, was a positive step towards normalization (Spence 1990).
Mao was also thought to be desirous of American assistance in the face of what he
perceived as Soviet betrayal and aggression. Conversely, Richard Nixon hoped to
improve his own domestic approval ratings through increased diplomacy with the
Chinese (Mann 2007). Thus, it was in the self-interest of both the United States and
China to draw closer toward one another in the early 1970’s. China needed the United
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States for economic assistance and protection now that Soviet aid was no longer reliable,
and America needed China’s help in counterbalancing Soviet influence in the Cold War.
This historically unique opportunity to work towards the normalization of SinoAmerican relations was not squandered and on February 27, 1972, in Shanghai, a Joint
U.S.-China Communiqué was issued. The document enumerated both states perspectives
on a number of topics relevant to the immediate geopolitical realities of the day, and both
agreed to disagree over their social and political systems. However, the most important
statement in the document was related to the status of Taiwan, which had long been a
contentious issue in Sino-American relations. The American representatives, in a move
that shocked many in the West, declared that “The United States acknowledges that all
Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that
Taiwan is part of China” (Marsh and Dreyer 2003, 117). To ensure there were no
uncertainties the Americans added, “The United States Government does not challenge
that position” (Marsh and Dreyer 2003, 118). Thus, the question of Taiwanese
independence was suddenly resolved and America was charged with turning their backs
to Taiwan in denying their requests for self-determination. Henry Kissinger later said “no
government less deserved what was about to happen to it than that of Taiwan” (Spence
1990, 628). Clearly, in 1972 the United States refused to be guided by ideational
concerns in relations with the Chinese, whether they be promoting democratization and
respect for human rights, or supporting Taiwanese independence. Realism was the order
of the day and the harsh truth is American foreign policy makers needed China’s help in
counterbalancing Soviet power more than they needed to endorse Taiwanese national
self-determination.
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The Chinese side intimated their desire for peaceful coexistence with the United
States, sovereignty, territorial integrity and for the non-militaristic resolution of global
problems. In respect to the issue of Taiwanese independence, the Chinese reiterated their
consistent viewpoint, “the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal
government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the
motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country
has the right to interfere” (Marsh and Dreyer 2003, 118). The United States and China
agreed that increased bi-lateral trade offered mutual benefits and that exchanges in the
fields of science, technology, culture and sports were beneficial to the health of both
nations. Interesting in light of today’s international environment, the Chinese side also
stated that “China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power
politics of any kind” (Marsh and Dreyer 2003, 119).
Formal diplomatic recognition, and thus truly normalized relations, weren’t
immediately established because it is thought that the Chinese terms could not be
expediently met without the United States permanently damaging their Pacific alliances
(Chang 1988). But by October 15, 1978, there were no more reservations and in both
Peking and Washington, a Joint Communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the United States of America and the Peoples Republic of China was
published. Following the formal diplomatic recognition of China, American foreign
policy assumed a different stance. Although the logic of international relations was still
driven by the Cold War and the United States still needed China to help balance Soviet
influence in 1979, there was a clear shift towards a rationale that justified the
normalization of Sino-American relations under a more nuanced pretense than realism
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and it strict balance of power thinking. Richard Nixon was a notable anti-communist who
could easily adopt a realist approach in relations with China without fear of political
consequences. Jimmy Carter, however, championed himself as an ardent supporter of
human rights that would stand against political repression. To silence any criticism he
might receive from those who would question his policies towards China on the grounds
that he was not being consistent in establishing relations with China and simultaneously
preaching the gospel of human rights and democracy, Carter advanced the premise that
relations with China should be based on the reality that progress had been made since the
Cultural Revolution. (Mann 2007)
This logic set the tone for an attitude toward Chinese repression that persists
today and is described as ‘looking the other way’ (Mann 2007, 75). ‘Looking the other
way’ evolved into engagement and soon the fact that America had normalized relations
with a repressive communist regime seemed more tolerable. Engagement is generally
described as the belief that increased American relations with the Chinese will provoke
their inevitable democratization (Mann 2007; Gallagher 2002; Saunders 2000). This
notion drives U.S. foreign policy toward China and is often used by American leaders to
justify continuing relations with the PRC. Most precisely, engagement means “that rather
than confronting China and containing China, what we should do is try to coax the
Chinese toward the eventual realization that ours is a better system, a better way of
governing a country and a better way of getting along with the world” (Talbott 2003, 5).
The reform mindedness of Deng Xiaoping meshed well with the American policy
of engagement and its overt optimism that the United States could somehow convince
China that it had a better system and construct an oppositional, multi-party democratic
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Chinese state through increased trade, investment and integration. Deng Xiaoping was
well-received in American foreign policy circles and applauded as a genuine reformer
whose ideological mindset represented a pleasant departure from the dogmatism of the
Mao regime. He was Time magazine ‘Man of the Year’ in 1979, and a generally positive
figure in most American minds (Schaller 1979, 192). However, Deng Xiaoping did not
accept the premise that the United States had an ideal system, much less one that the
Chinese people should aspire to achieve. A most telling example of how Deng Xiaoping
viewed the influences associated with foreign trade and investment is evident when he
exclaimed, “When you open the door, flies and mosquitoes come in” (Saunders 2000, 55)
Deng Xiaoping was unquestionably aware that opening the Chinese economy to
foreign trade and investment might present a challenge to the existing political order. But
he was prepared for this and argued that Mao had shunned openness only because he was
fooled in his old age by the conspiring ‘gang of four’ (Spence 1990). Deng Xiaoping
argued that he did not open to the West because he realized it had a better system, his
decision was motivated by the desire to strengthen the Chinese state. The Chinese were
completely reliant on Soviet economic, military and technological assistance when SinoSoviet relations turned violent and Mao was forced to seek help from the United States.
Deng Xiaoping may have also sought deeper relations with the United States because he
was still wary of Soviet intentions, but his most important concern was reaping the
economic and technological benefits of trading with the leading capitalist nation in the
world.
Deng Xiaoping believed in a policy of reform and openness because he
understood that China could not rise without economic assistance from the outside world
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(Chang 1988). He did not accept the Chinese model of national development that stressed
strict self-reliance, and Deng further distanced himself from communism by declaring
“ideology cannot supply economic development” (Spence 1990, 709). Mao Zedong was
an ideological zealot that ruled over China dogmatically, and when he met with Nixon in
1972 he was driven by a genuine fear of the Soviet Union. However, at the time of the
Deng-Carter normalization talks the state of Sino-Soviet relations were no where near as
threatening as they had been in the past. China was not driven by fear of the Soviet Union
or love of the West when it opened to the world in 1978. Fear of the Soviets may have
brought the United States and China closer together in 1972, but this time the Chinese
motives were entirely different.
Deng Xiaoping understood that China could not achieve economic modernization
through ideological fervor and self-reliance. The Cultural Revolution was a murderous
disaster that proved revolutionary zeal could not compete with foreign trade and
investment. The opening of the four special economic zones probably best symbolized
China’s ideological retrenchment from Mao’s strict doctrine of self reliance, but Deng
also encouraged individual enterprise and used foreign investment and technology to help
strengthen the anemic Chinese state. His reformist nature was not immediately popular
and the policy of openness produced a trade deficit for the first 4 years (Spence 1990).
However, in 1980 Deng Xiaoping finally won power over Hua Gofeng in a victory for
the reformist faction of the PRC that marked China’s full embrace of change. By then the
Chinese had ordered 3 jumbo 747 Boeing jets from Seattle and reached an agreement
with the Coca-Cola Company in Atlanta to sell their products in China and to open a
bottling plant in Shanghai (Spence 1990). Soon Peking began to resemble Western
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modernity and Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of economic openness proved quite effective as
an average GDP growth rate of nearly 10% was sustained from 1978-88 (Marsh 2005).
The American mindset that China would inevitably adopt Western political and
social norms in the face of growing economic prosperity and greater integration with the
outside world persisted throughout the Reagan administration and early into the George
H. Bush term. Then, suddenly the Tiananmen Square massacre and collapse of the Soviet
Union presented a unique challenge to the rationale of American foreign policy (Mann
2007). Now that America no longer needed to balance Soviet influence and because
media coverage of the Tiananmen Square incident proved the Chinese weren’t exactly
marching toward democracy, the United States was placed in the precarious position of
explaining their justification for maintaining relations with a communist Chinese regime
that violently crushed political dissent.
Although engagement is generally considered to have been initiated in the Carter
administration, Bush was the first president to publicly use the term as a catchword for
American policy toward China (Mann 2007). Bush reasoned the Chinese required
normalized relations with the United States because China might become a future threat,
and because this contact would serve to modify their political system. It is noteworthy
that Chinese economic growth did significantly decline following Tiananmen, as foreign
investors and traders began to question the idea of doing business with a reckless regime.
However, when America defended the policy of engagement it set the tone for China’s
reintegration into the international economy as the World Bank restored the more than $2
billion in interest-free loans it had frozen in response to the Tiananmen Square massacre
(Mann 2007). Although there was a litany of congressional hearings following the
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Tiananmen incident, no serious challenge to the PRC materialized and U.S.-Chinese
relations eventually returned to normalcy.
Bill Clinton campaigned that he would not coddle the Chinese government and
insisted that he would force their hand on the issues of democracy and human rights.
Clinton also questioned the geopolitical significance of China and threatened to tie
human rights concerns with trade in arguing that political repression would negatively
affect American economic relations with China (Mann 2007). However, he eventually
backed down from this idealistic stance, and in following the pattern established by
previous American presidents and foreign policy makers, Clinton quickly endorsed trade
and investment as the answer to democratizing China. This attitude is evident when
Clinton campaigned for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 1995. Here
he argued “it is likely to have a profound impact on human rights and political liberty”
(Mann 2007, 71) Moreover, the National Security Advisor also drew an analogy that
reasoned free trade from WTO membership would end one-party rule in China just as
NAFTA had done in Mexico (Mann 2007) Thus, while Clinton seemed to be tough on the
PRC at first, he eventually accepted that America could somehow convince the Chinese
to democratize and gave up the idea of linking trade to human rights.
Keeping with precedent, the current President Bush also chose to engage the
Chinese government under the pretense that it would affect political and social change.
When questioned on the development of democracy in China he offered, “I think about
South Korea…South Korea opened its economy up and then political reforms followed”
(Mann 2007, 87). The tragedy of 9/11 presented a complementary rationale to the policy
of engagement as normalized Sino-American relations were deemed an essential

20

necessity to defeating terrorism (Talbott 2003). Most recently, in a move criticized by
Democrats and Republicans alike, President Bush chose to attend the opening ceremonies
of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Several European leaders promised they would not attend
the opening ceremonies so as to convey their disapproval with China’s human rights
policies. However, President Bush took a stance more agreeable with the Chinese
government and their repeated insistence that the Beijing Olympics should be a nonpolitical event. Bush has responded to criticism emanating from his decision by stating
that to use the Olympics to make a political statement trivializes the cause of human
rights. However, this should not be surprising, especially since American foreign policy
is rooted in the belief that “If you treat China like an enemy, it will become an enemy”
(Mann 2007, 38). Thus, President Bush has stayed the course in relations with China and
embraced engagement as the driving principle of American foreign policy because he
believes that economic prosperity means political change is inevitable.
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CHAPTER 3
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND CHINA’S RISE
Although it was once the most prominent theory in international relations
literature, realism isn’t nearly as influential today (Albright 2006). 9/11 illuminated the
threat that non-state actors pose to American national security, thereby questioning the
idea of a state-centered approach to world politics that focuses on traditional threats
(Barnett 2004), and increasing levels of economic interdependency provide a powerful
incentive for maintaining peace (Russet and Oneal 2001; Florini 2005). Mearsheimer
(2001) argues realism is at odds with the optimism and morality of the American value
system because it assumes war is inevitable and discourages policies aimed at spreading
peace. Despite its unpopularity with the American people, realism as a theory has clear
predictive value and offers a rational lens through which to view the future of SinoAmerican relations.
The tenets of realism are that international politics is a zero-sum game where
states as the primary actors perpetually pursue power. Democracy doesn’t factor into
realist logic because all states are viewed the same, that is as power pursuing agents who
always act in their own self-interest. Realism explains international conflict through
reference to an anarchic international structure or human nature (Mearsheimer 2001).
Thus, an innate desire for power and the absence of an effective arbiter to ensure peace
means war is the normal state of affairs in a world where power is the key to survival.
Moreover, since the zero-sum game of international politics prevents one state from
increasing their power without weakening another states’ relative power position, “China
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and the United States are destined to be adversaries as China’s power grows”
(Mearsheimer 2001, 4).
Realist scholars are pessimistic about China’s rise. “China cannot rise peacefully,
and if it continues its dramatic economic growth over the next few decades, the United
States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable
potential for war.” (Mearsheimer 2005, 47) Offensive realism contends that China will
seek regional hegemony because this is the best means for their survival, and that a future
conflict between America and China is very probable since the United States will not
permit another regional hegemon in the international system (Mearsheimer 2001, 2005).
Offensive realism does not argue China has sinister intentions, only that it pursues power
to be in a similar position as the United States, that is where it doesn’t have to worry
about Japanese or Russian military threats much in the same way America never has to
worry about Brazilian or Mexican military advances (Mearsheimer 2001). But although it
provides a clear understanding for why China seeks power, realism doesn’t offer a
framework for maintaining peace. Rather, the inevitability of conflict is central to realist
theory, and the lasting impression is that “China is likely to try to dominate Asia the way
the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere” (Mearsheimer 2001, 118).
Realism argues nations have other concerns than just economics, and the idea that
a prosperous China will be a status-quo power overlooks the aggressive militarism of
Germany and Japan during the Second World War (Mearsheimer 2001, 2005). There is
growing fear that China is developing a military-industrial complex that seeks to
completely eliminate American influence in East Asia. Specifically, since economic
prosperity directly translates into increased power, a rich China is more of a security
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threat than a poor one, meaning the best policy for America should be attempt to slow
China’s economic growth (Mearsheimer 2001). The most interesting aspect of this
argument is that it also assumes “Most of China’s neighbors…will likely join with the
United States to contain China’s power.” (Mearsheimer 2005, 47) Thus, realism insists
that not only will China’s global ascension be affected by adversities with the United
States, but it will also be challenged by China’s closest competitors, who are equally
troubled with the idea of Chinese regional hegemony.
Conversely, liberalism is the other major theory of international relations, and
whereas realism views all states the same, liberalism emphasizes the importance of
democracy as a determining variable in predictions of conflict in dyadic relations. The
democratic peace is a quantitative finding based on mathematical modeling that utilizes
an epidemiological approach to locate the causal factors of conflict. The main statistical
finding from the democratic peace is that democracies are not likely to go to war with one
another. (Russet and Oneal 2001) Liberalism also stresses that economic calculations
have considerable influence that can help mitigate conflict. Data shows countries that
trade with one another are less likely to go to war than those who do not. (Russet and
Oneal 2001) Finally, liberalism argues that international institutions can fundamentally
alter a states’ behavior through clear delineation of acceptable and unacceptable behavior,
and that exchanges within these institutions and mutual membership are statistically
proven to help eliminate suspicion and clarify uncertainties that might otherwise lead to
war (Russet and Oneal 2001).
The most important implication from liberal research is that spreading democracy
promotes peace and because the policy of engagement assumes a prosperous China will
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inevitably become a democratic China, liberal theories accept the policy of engagement
under the assumption that economic influences can shape the political evolution of
China’s rise. (Russet and Oneal 2001; Talbott 2003) Moreover, since economic
interdependency means the prosperity of one nation is linked to that of another, liberals
argue economic concerns should override pure power based reasoning in U.S.-Chinese
relations. Liberals insist China will not be allowed to rise as a militarily powerful, nondemocracy because Western traders and investors will lose interest if the Chinese do not
politically reform (Russet and Oneal 2001) Specifically, because China is a member of
most major international institutions, and because foreign trade and investment in China
continues to grow, liberalism argues China will have to make political and social changes
to meet the requirements of its increased integration with the outside world.
Theories of democratization treat economic changes as the precursor to political
liberalization (Gallagher 2002). In effect, regime theories stress the importance of
economic growth, foreign trade, investment and integration as influencing factors in a
states’ democratization (Marsh 2005). The liberal approach argues that by learning from
the West in the economic realm and “...despite the best efforts of the Chinese Communist
party” (Russet and Oneal 2001, 294), China will inevitably democratize. The idea is that
the successes of capitalism will make democracy more attractive to the Chinese people.
Instead of trying to slow China’s economic growth from fear that it will rise as a power
competitor to the United States, liberalism encourages economic growth in China because
capitalist influences are thought to promote political liberalization (Russet and Oneal
2001).
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Engagement is best captured by the idea that “if you treat China like an enemy, it
will become an enemy” (Mann 2007, 38). Liberal theorists’ assume China’s decision to
adopt an economic reform strategy of openness will unquestionably translate into regime
change. They argue China’s most pressing concern is economic growth, and that the
continuance of one-party rule in China will have a negative impact on foreign trade and
investment (Russet and Oneal 2001). Liberals also disagree that China can completely
push America out of East Asia, and furthermore question the realist argument that China
even wants to be a regional hegemon. Their point is that if China could, “it would not
want to live with the consequences” (Brzezinski 2005, 49). Liberals argue that economic
prosperity will make China a status-quo power, and that the Chinese do not threaten the
existing international system because they are pleased with it (Lampton 2007). The most
damaging policy would be to prevent China from becoming more integrated with the
outside world and slow its economic growth because this would only lead to a new cold
war and strengthen the forces opposed to democracy (Gilboy and Heginbotham 2001).
Constructivism is not as historically established as realism and liberalism, but it is
an increasingly popular approach to understanding international relations that provides
definitive statements on U.S-Chinese relations. Constructivists stress the importance of
non-material factors, particularly norms, in reconstituting identities and restraining state
behavior. Norms are defined as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a
given identity”, and provide indirect evidence that embodies a sense of “oughtness”
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). Constructivism contends that the international order
is not entirely anarchic, but that it has customary modes of operation and codified treaties
and laws that define acceptable behavior. Norms matter, constructivists argue, because a
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state would not have to justify inappropriate actions if we truly lived in a world where
anything was allowed (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).
Regarding China’s rise, constructivist scholars offer similar prescriptions as
liberals but do not focus as much on traditional international institutions. They argue a
globalized civil society is looming in the twenty-first century, one that no state in the
modern international system can resist (Florini 2005). States will converge on a number
of issues, and through this process their identities and interests will be restructured
(Checkel 1998). This global civil society is characterized by states adhering to
international norms of non-aggression, transparency and cooperation (Florini 2005).
Thus, while realism argues China’s leaders aim for military modernization and regional
hegemony, constructivism believes that the norms of the liberal international order will
influence the direction of China’s rise and help prevent another great power war.
The constructivist approach also requires engagement with the Chinese.
Constructivist logic insists Chinese global aspirations can be tamed by changing China’s
identity and interests. This means that since China’s main concern is economic growth
and because the Chinese cannot rise without being a member of the globalized world,
then the forces of globalization will serve as the catalyst to prevent violence in U.SChinese relations. Constructivism implies that a globalized China will have different
interests and a new identity because it will be forced to adjust to the pressures of a liberal
world order (Florini 2005). A China concerned with economic growth simply cannot
afford to threaten the United States because this would be counterproductive to political
stability (Brezezinski 2005; Bijian 2005). Thus, for China to be accepted as a respectable
member of the international community, and for it to continue to prosper in the future,
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international norms cannot be ignored. China will have to change as its ties with the
outside world are strengthened, and these changes will help develop new interests and a
new identity for China. Constructivism argues normative factors will determine the
nature of China’s rise because traditional power politics are ineffective in an era of
increasing interdependency where the ability to choose is conditioned by international
norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).
The Future of China
Predictions on China’s future are diverse and reflect a wide ranging array of
emotions. (Bernstein and Munro 1997) fear a rising China will try to dominate Asia and
insist conflict is coming. (Pei 2003) is optimistic that economic modernization should
translate into political liberalization and believes in the policy of engagement, but he is
also worrisome that China’s persistent corruption and weak political institutions might
prevent this from happening and thinks China’s transition to democracy is currently
stalled (Pei 2006). (Chang 2001) also warns of China’s corrupt political climate, and
predicts a collapse of the CCP will be brought on by an inherent contradiction between
the forces of globalization and one-party dominance in China. While Gilley (2004) is
certain China’s democratization is inevitable and argues the process will be violent.
The diversity of the predictions is testament to the contentiousness of the
problem, but the debate is directly influenced by theoretical factors and can be discussed
accordingly. First, the liberal belief that economic prosperity is the key to
democratization provides the foundation for the policy of engagement and is critical to
several predictions on China’s rise. Gilboy and Heginbotham (2001) argue that China
will politically reform and that this transformation is the product of economic policy.
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They insist increased integration and economic growth has unleashed social forces that
threaten the Chinese regime with collapse. The only means for their survival is to reform
and Chinese leaders will be forced to re-legitimatize their rule by granting more freedom
to independent social organizations. Unemployed protestors, consumers angered by
deception that could possibly turn violent if their government inspired stock market
investments fail to make profit, special-interest groups and religious movements are
among the many frustrated elements in Chinese society that must be allowed greater
representation if China hopes to avoid internal frictions that might inspire domestic
revolution.
The central element in Gilboy and Heginbothams’ argument is that political
transformation is ‘coming’. They do temper their prediction by adding that China will not
become a Western-style democracy, and by stating that this transformation could be
potentially disastrous, but still insist that change cannot be resisted because collapse
would be imminent. The authors argue one-party rule in China has weakened the state
because economic growth and increased integration has helped establish a robust and
complex society that requires political reformation (Gilboy and Heginbotham 2001). The
current regime cannot last because China will have to transform to meet the demands of
its increased integration with the outside world. Political liberalization is associated with
economic prosperity, and the authors insist this relationship will manifest itself in the
context of China’s rise. The CCP and the Chinese state are one, but Gilboy and
Heginbotham contend that this connection cannot hold in an era of globalization. Political
liberalization will increase in the future because democracy is the most viable and
legitimate system of government, and the one-party nature of the Chinese state today
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cannot deal with the societal pressures associated with increased economic integration
and growth.
Pei (2006) is also influenced by the idea that economic prosperity necessitates
political change and argues China should be moving toward democracy, but he does not
predict China will democratize, only that its transition is trapped. Although he has
consistently argued in favor of engagement and believes “social and economic dynamism
has gained a self-sustaining momentum that is unlikely to be reversed by reactionary
policy changes by the regime” (Pei 2003, 58), Pei is appalled at the realities of China rise.
His prediction is that democracy is delayed in China because the political order is
legitimatized by economic growth, and that the crony capitalism that the regime promotes
is used to maintain a patronage system that discourages complete economic liberalization.
The crux of Pei’s argument is the absence of economic prosperity is not the
reason China hasn’t democratized, he faults the neo-Leninist state instead. He argues the
social elite are pampered by the government, and that under these conditions there is little
impetus for political or economic liberalization. State investment to private business
helps sustain one-party rule, and “social groups that are normally the forces of
democratization have been politically neutralized” (Pei 2006, 40). But Pei doesn’t believe
the current regime can sustain indefinitely, and warns “soon, we will know whether such
a flawed system can pass a stress test” (Pei 2006, 40). However, Pei’s contention that
democratic transition in China is trapped clearly demonstrates the influence the belief that
economic progress necessitates political change has in his analysis. For Pei, full
economic liberalization would be ideal for a globalized China because the ‘poor
governance’ of the authoritarian regime has been ‘concealed’ by economic growth , and
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even though the CCP has been able to maintain dominance for the last 30 years of
China’s rise, Pei isn’t sure if China’s political system can sustain a shock (Pei 2006, 40).
China should be moving closer toward democracy, but Pei admits it hasn’t, he is not
ready to accept the premise that the regime will adapt to the pressures of globalization
though, and his prediction suggests the future might be “decay” (Pei 2006, 32).
Gilley (2004) is the most bold in his prediction on China’s future, and argues that
democratization will be the product of a national crisis that challenges the current
regimes’ monopoly of power. Gilley believes this transition is inevitable, he insists there
is already great potential for democracy in China and argues that a democratic elite will
emerge from a violent revolution. The CCP will fall because it will not reform for fear of
losing power, and a violent revolution will then ensue, which in the end will result in
China’s democratization.
Gilley argues that China is already moving closer to democracy and it is only a
matter of time before a “national trauma” (Gilley 2004, 102) ignites democratic
revolution. Gilley also believes the authoritarian regime is not capable of dealing with the
pressures of globalization, and that the economic growth and integration of China over
the last 30 years has helped establish forces that demand political reform. The idea here is
that economic prosperity necessitates political change. Gilley envisions a democratic
China because he doesn’t believe an authoritarian regime is compatible with the social
pluralism that emerges from economic growth and integration, that is, a rich China will
ultimately become a democratic China.
Chang (2001) doesn’t think China will politically reform, much less democratize,
and he predicts that the current regime will collapse. He argues that China’s rise is not
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real, that is to say it has been fueled by corruption that is overlooked by outsiders dazzled
by architectural and economic achievements. Chang doesn’t discuss what might happen
after China collapses, and never commits himself to predicting that China will
democratize, but there are still traces of economic determinism that can be found in his
argument.
For Chang, China will collapse because it is corrupt, and since the liberal,
transparent rules of the WTO will expose this corruption, the CCP is destined to collapse
as China’s ties to the outside world are strengthened. Chang doesn’t argue that China will
inevitably democratize because of economic growth and integration, but he does believe
the authoritarian regime is not going to last in an era of globalization, especially since
China has been admitted to the WTO. Thus, Chang is also influenced by the belief that
economic changes precipitate political reform and argues because the CCP will not
reform it will have to collapse.
Next, Bernstein and Munro (1997) offer a prediction that is guided by the tenets
of realism, and in a similar tone as Mearsheimer, the authors insist that conflict is
coming. They argue the state-controlled media already portrays America as an enemy
that doesn’t want to see China rise. This attitude will eventually provoke violence and the
future of Sino-American relations will be characterized by conflict because China wants
to dominate East Asia.
But although their work is somewhat dated, and a number of things in both China
and America have changed considerably since the late 1990’s, the importance of their
work is that it reveals how theoretical assumptions condition predictions in the China
field. Bernstein and Munro predict China and America will go to war in the future
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because each wants to be a regional hegemonic power. However, there is only so far
America will allow the Chinese to rise before preventive measures will be taken to ensure
U.S power is not threatened. The authors do not believe America would allow Chinese
regional hegemony because realist logic implies that American influence would be
weakened. Also, the authors do not agree that economic progress will help prevent
conflict because realism teaches us that prosperity is another form of power. A rich China
will not be content with the existing international order, especially with the amount of
influence America has in East Asia, and it will eventually challenge U.S interests,
encouraging both balance of power politics and conflict.
Finally, Nathan (2003, 2006) cannot be pinned down to any specific theoretical
influence in his prediction on the direction of China’s rise. His main argument is the
authoritarian regime in China has been quite resilient. The focus of Nathan’s prediction is
that despite all the corruption and broken parts of the political and economic system in
China, there is little evidence supporting the claim that China will collapse or
democratize. Instead, Nathan argues the authoritarian regime has gained legitimacy
through economic growth, but more importantly it has accomplished several feats that
perpetuate one-party rule and help institutionalize power.
Nathan points out China’s “norm-bound nature” of “succession politics” (2003,
13), an increase in merit based promotions of political elites, specialization of institutions
in the regime, and the formation of centers for public political participation as indicators
the Chinese regime has consolidated its power and thwarted off the influences associated
with democratization and collapse (Nathan 2003). Nathan doesn’t suggest how long this
resilience will last, but neither does he predict that it cannot. Instead, his is different from

33

all of the other predictions on China’s future because he argues the authoritarian regime
is not destined to fail, and that it has been able to adapt to the pressures of globalization
without loosening its control of power. Nathan does question whether these incremental
adaptations will eventually alter the nature of the regime, but for now he argues the forces
usually associated with democratization have been negated by a political system that
“appears increasingly stable” (2003, 24).
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CHAPTER 4
THE LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
The tenets of realism are time proven and important to understanding the
historical causes of conflict. However, a closer examination of China’s interests seriously
challenges several realist views on the future of Sino-American relations. First, the idea
that a rising China will behave like other emerging great powers from the past loses merit
when considering China’s most important interest is economic growth. Ever since the
December 1978 Plenum, China’s leaders have focused on a reform strategy of openness
that endorses trade and investment as the keys for China to reach economic
modernization by the middle of the 21st century (Bijian 2005). The importance here is
that realist logic insists a rising China will become an inherent threat to American power,
but in China the government has used economic growth to legitimatize their rule (Nathan
2003). Because this prosperity is dependent on stable relations with the outside world,
instead of challenging the current international system China has chosen to embrace
globalization and thus become dependent on normalized relations with the United States.
Moreover, since China is nowhere close to Western standards in terms of economic
development, Chinese claims that for the next 50 years the focus will be strictly
economic seem more than mere diplomacy. The reality is China cannot rise without
America, and its global ascension will be unlike those of great powers in the past because
the age of globalization discourages conflict and the goal of economic modernization
cannot be achieved through traditional power politics.
Next, realist fears the Chinese have also utilized economic gain for military
advantage in constructing a defense force that aims at more than just protecting their own
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borders are excessively pessimistic. When viewed in light of China’s concerns regarding
America’s continued arms-sales to Taiwan, promotion of missile-defense systems in
Japan and South Korea, and its repeated calls for China’s democratization, then
increasing Chinese defense expenditures are reasonable (McNamara and Blight 2001). It
is only natural for the Chinese to respond to what they legitimately perceive as threats by
increasing military spending, and any notion that this increased spending is part of a
larger plan aimed at challenging American global supremacy is entirely unfounded.
China has never directly threatened American security interests and its leaders are
entrenched in enough domestic problems at the time to prevent any occurrence of foreign
military conquests in the immediate future.
Third, Mearsheimer’s claim that China’s neighbors will ally with America to
challenge Chinese regional hegemony ignores the history of East Asian international
relations. A constructivist analysis advanced by Kang (2007) posits a strong China has
traditionally been a stabilizing force in Asia, one most other nations have respected and
admired. He explains the majority of China’s foreign investment comes from its Asian
neighbors, and argues that from 1979 East Asia has been more peaceful than at any time
since the Opium War. Thus, the realist belief that a rising China will be confronted by an
alliance of its neighbors and the United States lacks an historical basis and
underestimates how content other nations might be with the reemergence of a powerful
Chinese state.
The most pressing problem associated with liberal theories of international
relations and their treatment of China’s rise is the sense of determinism they attribute to
democracy in predictions of conflict. Because the democratic peace theory asserts that
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democracies do not go war with one another, and because it is accepted that if China
would democratize the possibility of a Sino-American conflict would be significantly
reduced, it follows the policy of engagement is generally accepted by liberal theorists’ of
international relations. However, the complication with this approach to understanding
China’s rise is that because the goal is to democratize China through increased trade and
investment, if China doesn’t politically evolve in the manner liberal’s desire the chances
of conflict increase. Specifically, the democratic peace theory precludes objectivity in
relations with China because non-democracies are considered inherently threatening.
Liberal theories also emphasize the importance of economic growth, increasing
trade, investment and integration as influencing factors in a state’s democratization.
Moreover, most predictions in the China field insist the Chinese government will collapse
in a manner similar to the fall of the Soviet Union because one-party rule is incompatible
with modernity (Gilley 2004; Chang 2001). However, this line of reasoning ignores
China’s own reasons for reforming and its repeated claims that history is not over. Deng
Xiaoping did not introduce economic reforms in 1978 because he believed in the
superiority of Western politics and culture. In response to foreign influences that would
arise from his reform strategy of openness, Deng warned “when you open the door, flies
and mosquitoes come in” (Saunders 2000, 55) More recently, President Hu Jintao added
“The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the CPSU is not the defeat of
Marxism or Socialism…it is the final result of separation from, deviation from, and even
betrayal of Marxism…” (Marsh 2005, 1) The point is China looks upon foreign
investment and trade as factors that will strengthen an anemic Chinese state by
establishing political stability through economic growth, not as elements that necessitate
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political and social reform. The commitment to the creation of socialism that China’s
leaders currently display is ignored by scholars that do not accept the idea that the regime
can withstand the forces of change brought upon by increased integration, foreign
investment and trade.
Constructivism is not as historically established as realism and liberalism but it is
an increasingly popular approach to understanding international relations that focuses on
the importance of identity and norms in shaping state behavior. Normative scholars argue
anarchy does not mean war is normal, but that the structure of the international system is
what states make of it (Wendt 1992). In China’s case, normative influences brought upon
by increased integration and identity changes associated with the responsibilities of being
part of the globalized world have had minimal impact on affecting the social and political
changes in China that represent the rationale for engagement. The CCP has changed
considerably since the dogmatic self-reliant days of the early Mao regime and many of
the coastal regions in China today resemble Western conceptions of modernity. Foreign
trade and investment is the lifeblood of the current regime and economic prosperity is the
proudest achievement of the same government that once declared it immoral to be rich.
Thus, the norm shift that has occurred in China has not been one toward political and
social pluralism, but it is characterized by an acceptance of capitalism and a desire to
significantly increase material wealth.
The major critique of normative research is so much emphasis is placed on
demonstrating that norms matter, no one ever gets around to explaining why or how they
matter (Legro 2006). While China’s leaders show no evidence of disavowal of the norms
of non-aggression and although the CCP has openly abandoned the communist model of
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economic development, some major sticking points are transparency, human rights and
democracy. Transparency is achieved when an individual government allows its policies
to be judged and criticized by other states in the international system (Florini 2005). The
problem is the Chinese government does not want free speech to go awry, or for it to
provoke revolutionary epithets. A clear example of this fear is that every NGO must
register with the state before it is allowed to operate on Chinese soil (Hamrin 2005). This
means no NGO that is critical of the current regime is likely to have any significant
influence in affecting domestic political and social change. This is understandable when
considered in the context of Chinese politics and history, specifically in light of the
longstanding idea that the legitimacy of the state is not to be questioned, but Westerners
generally frown upon these policies as being inhumane and as restricting universal rights
of religious expression and free speech.
The Chinese, however, do not view independent social organizations as harmless
entities and further do not accept the idea that open criticism of the state is healthy.
Instead, they view Western conceptions of political modernity as inapplicable to China
because the significance of the extent of poverty demands an authoritarian regime that
does not have to work within the channels of democratic governance to achieve its goals.
Moreover, constructivism would expect China to change its identity so as to avoid public
shaming and a general tarnishing of its reputation, especially since it is integrated into the
world economy and aims at attracting foreign trade and investment. But the PRC is a
historically consistent abuser of human rights and has not experienced enough domestic
political backlash from the West for it to permit social pluralism and a civil society
outside the realm of government. The fact that the Beijing Olympics were not boycotted
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by the United States demonstrates the hope that one day China will change and that for
now decisions of trade and investment need not be related to human rights and issues of
social freedom.
Finally, democracy is still an afterthought in a nation where the GDP per capita is
lower than many of its Asian neighbors. China may be a potential superpower, but it is
also a developing country working toward basic economic modernization and has
historically disagreed with the idea that democracy is the ideal political system (Zhao
2008; Marsh 2005). The Chinese political regime is authoritarian and will likely remain
this way while China moves toward economic modernization (Nathan 2003). Any hope
that prosperity will directly translate into political and social pluralism also loses merit
when considering the most internationally engaged and educated elements of Chinese
society defended the PRC during recent Olympic protests (Zhao 2008). Economic growth
has legitimized the authoritarian regime and instead of an inevitable democratization
brought upon by China’s increased integration with the international community, the
PRC has become an integral part of the world economy despite its political deficiencies.
In the process, the CCP has won over the Chinese people while limiting the impact the
social and political norms of the liberal international order have had on shaping the
evolution of China’s rise. The norms related to economic thinking and foreign trade and
investment have affected the Chinese mind in the era of globalization, but norms of
human rights, transparency, democracy and free speech are still in the very early stages of
their life cycle and there is little evidence that they will be internalized by the Chinese
people or government anytime soon.
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Realists do not accept that China has never directly threatened American
security and overlook the pacifying effect of economic interdependency and the positive
relationship China has with its neighbors, while liberals overemphasize democracy in
their predictions of war and assume a rich China will inevitably become a democratic
China. Moreover, constructivists neglect that China has not necessarily embraced
Western civil society as an ideal, and that normative influences are conditioned by
Chinese history and politics. China’s leaders have a long view of history and it would be
wise to consider that just because South Korea and Mexico have responded in a particular
way to integration does not mean China, who is entirely more important to world peace
than either of these two nations, will respond in a similar manner.
My approach to understanding the future of Sino-American relations treats
China as a unique nation that must be observed independently and without theoretical
biases. Because no theoretical lens offers a sound prediction on the direction of China’s
rise it is important to consider other avenues that have contributed to China’s startling
economic growth. A recent MIT study shows that “labor costs are not the end all be all of
globalization” (Doyle 2007, 61) Critics of China’s human rights policies and scholars
who insist that China has grown because it is corrupt and prospers from repression should
investigate changes associated with market-institutions in China. In this regard, the
International country risk guide calculates rule of law measures that are determined on a
six-point scale with six representing the highest score. This measure is composed of two
sub-components that represent the quantification of both law and order. Specifically, the
law component captures the degree to which legal codification is developed and generally
focuses on questions related to the establishment of law. The order measure observes if
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the law is obeyed and the extent to which criminal offenses occur. Because a nation ruled
by law is more attractive to foreign investors and traders my research will compare
foreign direct investment and trade with rule of law measures in China to better
understand the causes of economic growth. The importance here is that if increased rule
of law measures helped contribute to China’s growing levels of foreign trade and
investment then optimism that Chinese politics and society will liberalize can be
substantiated. Specifically, most democracies have established the rule of law and in
China’s case if measures have indeed increased then it could be legitimately argued that
economic factors will determine the nature of China’s rise and help develop the essential
foundations of a democratic regime.
Next, because liberal theories see increased trade and investment as factors
associated with political and social change my research will also observe the evolution of
China’s freedom house scores to determine what impact prosperity has had on freedom.
Freedom House measures political and civil liberties associated with democracies but is
not an overt quantification of democracy and will therefore capture subtle societal
improvements that a strict polity measure might ignore. The reason for this approach is
that because American foreign policy towards China is driven by the belief that increased
trade and investment will alter China’s political system then it seems appropriate at this
thirty year interval to evaluate whether some of the desired changes have occurred.
Specifically, by comparing the development of freedom with economic growth questions
of whether prosperity will do to China what it has done for other countries can be more
thoroughly understood.
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Finally, hope that because China is integrated into the world economy its people
will grow closer to the West and start to press their government to grant independent
social organizations and protestors more influence and generally begin to question CCP
social and political policies is directly related to the premise of engagement. Mann (2007)
argues the idea is that if China has a Starbucks and if its people are given more consumer
choices than political rights, then the carryover effect will hopefully be both demands for
increased liberalization and a positive relationship with the United States. The essential
desire is foreign trade, investment and integration with the outside world will draw the
Chinese people closer to the United States and strengthen their relationship with the
American people and government. In this respect, the 2007 C-100 survey aims at
capturing both Chinese attitudes toward the United States and American feelings
regarding China. This survey is administered in both China and the United States by a
committee of non-partisan and non-profit Chinese Americans who aim at developing
understanding between these two nations. The poll in China is conducted by Horizon
Research Consultancy Group and the data from America is compiled by Zogby
International. The survey measures the attitudes of congressional members, the general
public, and business and opinion leaders in China and the United States. Along with the
C-100 survey results, writings on Chinese nationalism and its various manifestations and
other evidence demonstrating the impact American calls for human rights reform have
had on Chinese attitudes toward the United States will better illustrate whether increased
ties with the outside world will help eliminate fear and suspicion in Sino-American
relations.
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My approach also assumes war is not likely because of increased
interdependency. However, rather than hope prosperity will translate into political and
social change because it has in other nations, I will only observe what has happened in
China over the last 30 years to determine where the future might lead. This attitude is
testament to both the uniqueness of China and the theoretical limitations of international
relations. Predictions in the China field are derived from theoretical assumptions and to
overcome the biases associated with this approach I will use rule of law measures,
freedom house scores and survey results to better understand the rise of China. If China is
indeed headed down the path liberal theories imply then there should be a marked
improvement in rule of law measures to help explain China’s increased levels of foreign
trade and investment. Second, rather than assume China will inevitably become freer as
its economy grows, an observation of China’s freedom house scores should better
illustrate the relationship between economics and politics in the PRC. Last, because
normative scholars stress the importance norms have in changing identities and attitudes,
I will look at several surveys designed at capturing Chinese attitudes towards America
with focus aimed at illuminating how individual Chinese citizens view the United States
today. Together these sources will predict China’s future on the basis of what has actually
happened, rather than what traditionally occurs.
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CHAPTER 5
THE REALITIES OF CHINA’S RISE
Thirty years of economic prosperity has increased consumer choices and the
Beijing Olympics probably best symbolize the strength of China’s integration into the
international community. China has enjoyed an average growth rate of nearly 10% since
1978 and currently shows no signs of an impending economic collapse or slowdown.
Today it attracts more foreign investment than any other developing country in the world
and trade levels continue to increase. This prosperity is largely driven by the
normalization of relations with the United States and the forces of globalization. But
other factors are at the heart of China’s economic growth and understanding these
influences will help determine China’s future.
Realism argues decisions of trade and investment are directly related to security
concerns and that states will not trade with other countries they are hostile with or those
that might become future threats because prosperity is another form of power. Liberals
argue political factors dominate a state’s thinking on matters of trade and investment, and
insist because democracies are more accountable they make ideal trading partners.
However, the parameters of this debate have been expanded in the age of globalization as
new research emphasizes the importance of market-institutions in decisions of trade and
investment (Li and Resnick, 2003; Souva, Smith and Rowan, 2005). The proper marketinstitutions include elements like the rule of law, protection of private property and an
efficient banking system. The most important distinction in this approach to
understanding the causes of trade and investment is that states do not trade, firms do, and
because transactions costs drive their thinking, political concerns are not as significant.
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In China’s case, realist and liberal theories are irrelevant as American decisions
of investment and trade have not been guided security concerns or political similarities.
The Cultural Revolution was still happening when Nixon went to China and following
the Tiananmen Square massacre it was the United States that led the way for China’s
restored access to international finance networks (Mann, 2007). Both of these events are
evidence of how the policy of engagement has shaped American thinking on matters of
trade and investment and illustrate the hope that economic prosperity will eventually
force China to politically and socially reform. But firms will not trade and invest with the
Chinese just because American foreign policy is driven by the idea that a rich China will
become free, their decisions are derived from self-interest.
The most obvious factors responsible for China’s growing levels of trade and
investment are low labor costs and an absence of workers rights. These conditions are
efficient because a lack of protection for workers shifts the balance of power in favor of
business and cheap labor helps lower production costs. However, if increased levels of
trade and investment are to be fully explained, and if they are to be factors that contribute
to China’s democratization, then rule of law, which is usually strongest in democracies,
should have also improved to help justify increasing levels of trade and investment.
When trade and investment in China are considered in the context of rule of law
measures it becomes clear the reason China has grown is not because it is entirely
corrupt. Table 5.2 shows there has been some improvement of rule of law in China, but in
truth the influence a proper legal system has had in affecting decisions of trade and
investment is not as significant as cheap labor costs and a lack of workers rights. Rule of
law measures from 1986-91 lingered at only 2.86 on a scale of 6, while levels of foreign
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investment and bi-lateral trade with America made only slight improvements. When rule
of law measures improved to 4.16 in 1992, foreign direct investment increased by $6.6
billion in one year, a significant amount compared to the 2.5 billion increase from 198691. Moreover, rule of law does seem to have a positive impact as trade and foreign direct
investment increased every year from 1993-98, with a 16.5 billion increase in investment
occurring in 1993 when China’s rule of law measures improved to 5. However, rule of
law measures weakened to 4.75 and 4 in 2000-01, after which the measure increased to
4.5 in 2002 and remained until 2004. In this regard, WTO membership for China
dramatically affected levels of trade and investment and probably negated the losses
China might have suffered in response to their declining rule of law measures. The
findings do basically support the market institutions approach to understanding decisions
of trade and investment, although the distinction is the rule of law has not yet been
established in China as a market institution that promotes trade and investment. The rule
of law does have a positive impact, but it offers little explanatory power in China’s case
because the relationship between legal reform and foreign trade and investment has been
affected by WTO membership, the policy of engagement and firms looking to become
more efficient in labor costs.
The economic reality of China’s rise is cheap and exploited labor is an attractive
magnet for firms looking to trade and invest abroad. For China, the rule of law has
improved compared to measures in 1986, but in recent years the importance legal
institutions have had in attracting trade and investment has also diminished. China does
not have an independent judiciary, rule of law measures are lower today than in 1993,
and the most appropriate response to inquiries on decisions of trade and investment in
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China is that the lack of legal protections have not discouraged foreign firms from
investing in the PRC. Transaction costs can be lowered in a number of different ways,
and in the context of China’s rise the efficiency associated with cheap labor and an
unrestrained regime overrides the burdens of dealing with a nation that shows little
respect for the rule of law. Legal improvements were achieved in order for China to
become a WTO member but once membership was acceded the focus on continuing to
make progress was scaled down as lowered labor costs and a flexible regime became the
most attractive elements of trading and investing in China.
Because the Chinese economy has grown consistently since Deng Xiaoping
opened to the West in 1978 and seeing that China has been formally integrated into the
international system through increased levels of foreign trade and investment, the general
feeling is U-S-Chinese relations are moving in the right direction. Moreover, optimism
that economic growth and integration will instigate demands for greater freedom is the
cornerstone of American foreign policy towards China. It follows that extraordinary
economic growth coupled with increased trade, investment and integration should have
helped create a more free and open China as measured by freedom house because as a
continuous variable it will capture subtle increases in freedom that more overt measures
of democracy might ignore.
The results, however, prove that American foreign policy is misguided in
assuming China will inevitably become free as its economy grows. Increased American
trade and foreign direct investment has not increased measures of freedom because
foreign investment was actually lowest when China was most free. Table 5.3 shows from
1985-88 China had a freedom measure of 6 on a 7 point scale where 1 represented the
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highest score and foreign investment peaked at $3.2 billion. Trade and investment levels
continued to grow from 1992-1998, the period during which China was least free, and
actually dropped in 1999-2000 when China’s freedom rating improved. Increasing levels
of foreign investment returned in 2001 with China’s entry into the WTO and continued
throughout 2005. Bi-lateral trade with China, both total exports and imports measured in
millions of U.S. dollars, also grew steadily from 1987-2005. The only actual decline was
American exports to China in 1999, which is when China’s freedom rating improved.
WTO membership has dramatically affected American trade with China as imports and
exports increased the most rapidly from 2001-2007.
The main finding that freedom discourages foreign trade and investment is
extremely problematic for proponents of the policy of engagement. The hope that a
vibrant Chinese economy will provide the impetus for social and political change is not
grounded in reality. However, this finding is consistent with new research that
emphasizes the flexibility of non-democracies and their ability to operate without the
constraints usually associated with nations that have elected officials (Li and Resnick,
2003). The point is the Chinese economy has been able to attract foreign trade and
investment without making an effort to politically and socially modernize because the
authoritarian regime is efficient. Firms looking to trade and invest in China are not
discouraged by the absence of basic political and social rights, their focus is maximizing
profit and a lack of freedom has not been detrimental for the Chinese economy because
labor costs are more significant than moral or patriotic concerns.
The most reasonable explanation for the lack of social and political reforms in
China is that the regime never intended to let globalization determine the nature of
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China’s rise. China did not open to the world because it decided to move closer to
Western conceptions of modernity, instead this move was entirely motivated by selfinterest. The initial desire was to strengthen China in the face of Soviet aggression and to
establish normalized relations with America so as to better face the Soviet threat.
Eventually this move evolved into a strategy that accepted trade and investment as the
means by which one-party rule would be legitimatized in China. Undoubtedly, this
strategy has been quite effective as the CCP has maintained its stranglehold on power
without moving closer toward democracy or collapse. Conversely, the policy of
engagement has been a complete failure because optimism that economic growth will
necessitate freedom is not grounded in reality. China has prospered, but this prosperity
has not created the conditions for freedom and has instead legitimatized the current
regime.
There is another explanation for the lack of freedom in China that is also
consistent with these findings. Despite the economic successes of the last thirty years,
China has not politically and socially evolved because its mode of integration into the
international economy is different than most other nations (Gallagher 2002). Instead of
political and social reforms being implemented before economic integration happens,
China has been allowed to enjoy all the benefits and privileges of economic relations with
the globalized world without making serious efforts at reform because engagement
reasons economic factors can influence political and social behavior. Specifically, trade
and investment in China are conditioned by the premise that a non-democracy cannot
survive in a transparent, globalized world of democracies. From this assumption the
policy of engagement encourages trade and investment with China because it is thought
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that as its ties to the outside world are strengthened China will be forced to reform. This
means there is no impetus for political and social change in China because rather than
have to reform first like most other nations before being afforded the rights and privileges
of economic integration, in China’s case the process has been reversed.
China cannot be expected to democratize because its leaders never intended to let
foreign trade and investment determine their future, and because its mode of integration
in the international economy was not conditioned by political and social reform. But
before moving on another reason China has continued to enjoy economic growth without
democratizing or facing sanctions from the rest of the world is because of its shear
importance to America and the global system of commerce. Cheap Chinese labor and
goods enable American materialism and saves consumers millions of dollars annually.
Moreover, the international system has also grown dependent on China as its levels of
foreign trade and investment have soared in recent years and made it almost
counterproductive to hope the repressive regime will collapse. Thus, the China that the
world has embraced has not made significant political and social changes because to do
so would be economically risky and could potentially disrupt the current regime’s claim
to power.
However, just because China has not moved closer toward democracy or freedom,
does not mean that American foreign policy cannot make serious inroads with the
Chinese people. If America could convince the people of China that its intentions are
peaceful and that it intends to work with the Chinese in the future, then relations can be
improved. In this regard, it is important to look at other avenues that might help
determine the future of China. Survey data is very useful because as a closed society it is
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difficult to gauge how ordinary Chinese view American policies. The most troubling
aspect of these findings is that American foreign policy has not been successful in
changing the hearts and minds of the Chinese people because most citizens are given a
tainted view of the United States by a state-controlled press.
A telling survey reveals the friction that can be caused by an American foreign
policy that is overtly critical of China. In a 1998 poll of 5,700 residents in eleven Chinese
cities, it was reported that 27 percent cited American criticism of China’s human rights
record as the cause of their resentment against the United States (Hamrin 2003). The
significance here is the United States is called on by voters and NGO’s to pressure the
Chinese regime to respect human rights, but in reality these gestures are never really
genuine and only serve to legitimatize CCP claims that America is an imperialistic power
bent on world domination. Thus, the reality of American efforts at improving human
rights in China is that criticism can discourage ordinary Chinese citizens from growing
closer to the United States.
The 2007 C-100 survey on American and Chinese attitudes toward one another
also questions whether U.S-Chinese relations have improved (Committe100.org). 40% of
the American general public view the economic emergence of China as a potential threat
to U.S. interests and only 25% see it as a partner. Also, 55% of the Chinese general
public predicts China will be the world’s leading superpower in 20 years, and another
45% believe America is trying to prevent China from rising. More complicating is that
only 32% of the general public in America believes it should intervene to defend
Taiwanese declarations of independence, while in Chinese views Taiwan remains the
issue with the most potential for conflict with America. More than 70% of the American
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general public gives the Chinese government a negative rating in relations with the
United States, and 58% of China’s sampled population gave it a positive score. These
differences of opinion also manifest themselves in attitudes regarding the direction of
each nation as the vast majority of Chinese think China is headed in the right direction
while the majority of Americans feel its government is not. Thus, the main finding from
survey data aimed at capturing both Chinese and American views is that both nations
have very different conceptions of the future, and any notion that relations today are
better than in years past lacks sound evidence.
The simplicity of this study is essential to making the claim that American
economic influences will not democratize the Chinese. Rule of law has not been
established in China, but trade and investment levels have not suffered either because
cheap labor and the flexibility of the authoritarian regime help lower transaction costs. If
China’s economic rise could be attributed to legal reform then improvements in human
rights and democracy could rationally be considered inevitable. Moreover, American
leaders could better defend the policy of engagement if China also made moves to
increase freedom and transparency. The lack of freedom in China is clear to everyone,
and while no one defends the regime, those who question the idea of doing business with
a repressive Chinese state are often demonized (Mann 2007). Even hope that America
can convince the Chinese to reform through diplomatic efforts is without a legitimate
basis because most Chinese fear the United States does not want China to become
powerful. The ultimate message from this study is that China is a unique nation with a
long view of history, and in recent years the idea that economic changes necessitate
political and social reforms have blinded America to the realities of China’s rise. China is
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less free today than in 1985, there is no independent judiciary, rule of law measures have
recently declined, transparency is frowned upon by China’s leaders as a threat to
sovereignty and human rights are still an afterthought in decisions of trade and
investment. The most basic certainty derived from this study is that China will continue
to rise because it is already integrated into the international economy and because its
increased levels of trade and investment are encouraged by the policy of engagement. But
again, any notion that democracy is inevitable in China lacks concrete evidence and is
merely hopeful wishing because the realities of China’s rise reveal the true nature of its
economic growth.
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Table 5.1
Economic Growth, Trade and Investment in China 1987-2007
Year

Annual
GDP Growth %
For China

Chinese
Imports
in U.S. millions

American
Exports
in U.S. millions

Foreign Direct
Investment
in U.S. billions

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

11.6%
11.3%
4.1%
3.8%
9.2%
14.2%
13.5%
12.6%
10.5%
8.6%
8.8%
7.8%
7.1%
8%
8.3%
9.1%
10.0%
10.1%
9.9%
11.1%
11.4%

6.3
8.5
12
15.2
19
25.7
31.5
38.8
45.5
51.5
62.6
71.2
81.8
100
102.3
125.2
152.4
196.7
243.5
287.8
321.5

3.5
5
5.7
4.8
6.3
7.4
8.8
9.3
11.7
12
12.9
14.2
13
16.2
19.2
22.1
28.4
34.7
41.9
55
65

2.3
3.2
3.4
3.5
4.4
11
27.5
33.8
37.5
41.7
45.3
45.5
40.4
42.1
48.8
55.0
53.5
60.6
72.4
60.3
74.8

Source: www.chinability.com; www.census.gov
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TABLE 5.2
Rule of Law in China 1984-2004
1984

1985-1999

1992

2.86

3

4.16

1993-1999 2000
5

2001

2002-2004

4

4.5

4.75

International Country Risk Guide

TABLE 5.3
Political and Civil Liberties in China 1985-2008
1985-1988
6

1989

1990-2008

7

freedomhouse.org
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6.5

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Huntington (2005) argues an American national identity was formed from the
adversities the United States experienced with the Soviet Union during the cold war.
Specifically, the bipolarization of world affairs offered the Soviets as an ideological
enemy that the American national identity could be easily defined against. Huntington
notes the role of other is causal in theories of identity formation and argues that without
the Soviets to struggle against the prominence and solidity of American nationalism
waned. This sentiment is best captured by John Updike when he asked, “Without the cold
war what’s the point of being an American?” (Huntington 2005, 258)
Similarly, Barnett (2004) describes how military and pentagon officials were
adversely affected by the Soviet demise, and how they strained to justify defense
expenditures in a suddenly unipolar world. Barnett explains that defense department
requests for funding were usually unchallenged throughout the cold war because of the
seriousness of the struggle with the Soviets and the singularity of their threat. However,
when the cold war ended and the specter of Soviet global hegemony lost all reasonable
grounding, a desperate search for America’s next near-peer was initiated to help sustain
defense expenditures that could no longer rely on a bipolar international power structure
for their justification.
The cold war’s conclusion, then, left the American military and defense
establishment in a precarious position, and it is in this very environment, one where the
United States was desperately searching for a new enemy to replace the sudden and
unexpected fall of the Soviets, that some Pentagon officials actually attempted to market
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China as America’s next great power competitor (Barnett 2004). Even more, some of the
same neo-conservatives who have been credited with influencing the decision to go to
war with Iraq also viewed China as a great potential threat that needed to be confronted
on issues of democracy and human rights (Halper and Clarke 2004). However, in respect
to both neo-conservatives and those in the pentagon who tried to promote China as the
next great threat to American global hegemony, soon the logic of economic
interdependency would mitigate any friction in relations that might turn violent. China’s
leaders understand the importance of avoiding conflict with the United States because it
is American trade and investment that has largely fueled China’s global ascension and
helped legitimatize the existing regime’s power structure. Conversely, the United States
cannot afford an antagonistic relationship with China because it would increase consumer
prices and adversely affect the American economy.
However, the major factor that helped contribute to avoiding the polarization of
Sino-American relations following the end of the cold war was the tragedy of 9/11. The
war on terror understandably distracted Americans from Chinese human rights abuses,
but it also seemingly saved China from a potential confrontation with the United States
(Fukuyama 2005). In a hypothetical scenario where 9/11 doesn’t occur it becomes
interesting to predict how different Sino-American relations might be today, especially
considering policy influences associated with regime change in Iraq were entirely hostile
towards the Chinese before 9/11. Maybe news of Chinese industrial espionage,
intellectual property rights infringements, dangerous imports, government repression,
corruption, and China’s growing international influence would affect the American mind
differently in a world where 9/11 never happened. In respect to Huntington’s argument
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that an American national identity was constructed from the ideological struggle between
communism and democracy during the cold war, perhaps the Chinese government would
have been viewed in the same unfavorable terms as some Middle Eastern states are today,
and maybe China would have been chosen for regime change and assumed the role of
other to the American national identity had the specter of terrorism not affected the
American consciousness first.
It does seem unlikely though, especially in light of the current levels of economic
interdependency between China and the United States that neoconservative grumblings
concerning the Chinese threat would have been as effective in orchestrating an invasion
of China as they were in helping to develop the rationale for regime change in Iraq. But
what is clear about Barnett’s revelation that pentagon officials attempted to market China
as America’s next near-peer following the collapse of the Soviet Union is that it serves to
illustrate how Sino-American relations have historically been characterized by
misunderstanding.
The findings in this study demonstrate American foreign policy toward China is
still affected by misunderstanding and casts significant doubt on the underlying logic
surrounding the policy of engagement. The inexpensive and massive Chinese labor
market is an attractive magnet for American businesses looking to operate more
efficiently, and the Chinese government has been extremely effective in developing a
secure economic environment that meets foreign firm’s demands. Neo-liberalism reasons
the relevant changes China makes to develop a favorable business climate for foreign
investment and trade should also help integrate China into an international community of
nations that are governed by the tenets of transparency, rule of law, democracy and
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economic liberalization. Specifically, engagement holds that as the Chinese economy
grows and as its people prosper, China will succumb to the underlying themes of the
international system and evolve into a full-fledged free market democracy. However, the
analysis presented here does not accept the idea that China is marching toward
democracy, that a rich China means a democratic China, or that the political and social
evolution of China’s rise will necessarily be determined by foreign economic interests.
Economic interdependency between the United States and China will continue to
strengthen in the future and these ties will help eliminate the chances of war. However,
the most important distinction is that regardless of whether China makes the associated
political and social changes that are generally analogous with economic modernization,
foreign trade and investment will continue unabated. The position taken in this paper is
that America cannot afford to change China because it has already grown too accustomed
to the existing relationship it has with the Chinese. The disheartening truth is China’s
repressive political and social system helps fuel American consumerism. If China were to
suddenly implement Western standards of practice in areas of labor rights, political
representation and economic liberalization, then the price of Chinese imports would
undoubtedly increase, as this would both adversely affect American consumers and
disrupt the basis of legitimacy that the Chinese government operates from. Thus, because
America has grown dependent on China, and because the Chinese government has
solidified their rule through economic growth, it will be extraordinarily difficult to
change the nature of the Chinese regime without also harming American economic
interests and disrupting the international order.
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Drawing from literature that emphasizes China’s mode of integration into the
international system, evidence showing how economic growth has legitimatized the
current Chinese regime, and data that clearly demonstrates China has not improved the
rule of law or increased freedom, this analysis concludes that China will not fit the usual
model of economic modernization that associates prosperity with freedom. The CCP is
seriously flawed, but economic growth has lifted 300 million people out of poverty in
only 30 years (Kharas 2005), and for now the successes of the regime will likely
overshadow its repressiveness. Power has always been centralized in China and loyalty to
the state still prevails in a nation that suffers from a century of humiliation. Hope that
China’s population will grow closer to the United States is yet to be substantiated as well.
The Chinese people are fiercely loyal to the regime and in response to Olympic torch
relay protests the most educated and internationally engaged sided with the authoritarian
regime (Zhao 2008). Thus, the political, economic and social realities of China’s rise are
that the Chinese government has not made the slightest move toward democracy, the
flexibility of the regime and cheap labor has enabled the status quo to go challenged, and
rather than grow closer to the West the Chinese people have chosen to embrace the CCP
as the only legitimate power in China.
These findings are consistent with the analyses of Mann (2007) and Nathan
(2003, 2006). But whereas Mann wonders if China is integrating America into a new
international system, my analysis accepts that it already has. America is dependent on the
Chinese state that exists today and cannot expect political and social reforms because
there is little incentive for China’s leader’s to pursue their implementation. There has
even been a proposition by an American scholar to create a new G-2 that would allow the
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United States to better adapt to China’s growing economic influence (Bergsten 2008). He
explains “China is uncomfortable with the very notion of simply integrating into a system
it had no role in creating.” (Bergsten 2008, 64) Moreover, Nathan demonstrates the
resiliency of the authoritarian regime in China and cautions against predictions that
assume it cannot survive in the age of globalization. But he also believes that if American
foreign policy would separate the promotion of democracy from human rights concerns
then progress could be made in areas of social reform. However, my analysis
demonstrates the negative impact American criticism of China’s human rights policies
has on Chinese attitudes toward America and questions how the United States can affect
change in China without perpetuating the popular belief that America does not want to
see China rise.
The rise of China does not have to necessitate America’s fall, but it does mean a
certain level of consciousness is required to accept the realities associated with China’s
return to power. The implications of these findings are that the relationship between
economic growth and integration and political and social reform will not be the same in
China as it has been in other nations. However, there are numerous areas where America
and China have similar interests; environmental pollution, dealing with North Korea,
terrorism, alternative energy sources, and global epidemics like AIDS and SARS. If these
areas of convergence can override questions related to China’s human rights policies and
their system of governance, then the future of Sino-American relations will undoubtedly
be peaceful and mutually prosperous. If not, then American foreign policy makers run the
risk of making China an ideological enemy to the United States, one that becomes the
other from which America defines itself in the twenty-first century.
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Gone are the days of Tiananmen Square and the Beijing Olympics are the new
international image for China. But although it does seem doubtful in light of the current
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that Americans will unite in opposition to a rising China
that fails to democratize and continues to disrespect basic human rights, it cannot be
entirely dismissed. American foreign policy justifies normalized relations with China by
telling the American people that economic influences will determine the nature of
China’s rise (Mann 2007). However, judging from the obvious failures of the policy of
engagement, if American economic power were to weaken in the future then maybe the
blame would be placed on China. There is already angst over the loss of jobs to
outsourcing and a quarter of Americans view the emergence of Chinese global economic
power as a serious threat. However, it cannot be forgotten that China contributes to
American materialism through cheap and exploited labor, and any tension with the
Chinese would also adversely affect the United States. Thus, the most important aspect of
American foreign policy toward China should be to better explain to the American people
both the realities of China’s rise and the United States relationship with the Chinese.
China will not democratize anytime soon, in fact there is no real evidence suggesting that
it ever will, and hope that the Chinese people will grow closer to America as their ties to
the outside world are strengthened have yet to be substantiated. Real progress in SinoAmerican relations can only be made when perpetuation of the myth that China will
politically and socially modernize as its economy grows is both discouraged and
forgotten.
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